Safe Haven From the Trade War?

A lot has happened surrounding tariffs since President Donald Trump took office three weeks ago. While the long-expected increase to tariffs on Chinese goods was applied, the levy was 10%–not the 60% proposed on the campaign trail. President Trump announced 25% tariffs on Columbia which were later rescinded and took similar action with 25% tariffs on Mexico and Canada, only to delay their implementation until early March. In all three of these cases, the tariffs appear to not be about economic policy, but about gaining concessions on illegal immigration and related trafficking issues. The number one surprise in our Top 5 Surprises for 2025 was "tariffs being much higher and then abruptly dropped or sharply reduced." Tariffs being more bark than bite (so far) supports our outlook for both heightened market volatility and our positive outlook for the markets this year. But, while a pattern looks to have been established, the market is far from done with tariff risks in 2025.

Delayed not dropped

President Trump delayed the tariffs for Canada and Mexico from the start of February to the start of March, after initially being planned for Trump's first day in office on January 20. At that time, they will be reevaluated based on the success of planned border enforcement efforts. This echoes the similar threat of 25% tariffs on Mexico made by Trump during his first term, which was dropped 10 days later after Mexico agreed to increase border security.

If the proposed 25% across-the-board tariffs for Canada and Mexico are implemented in March, the high dependence on exports to the U.S. for those two countries is likely to heighten the risk their economies slip into a recession. In fact, with Mexico's GDP negative in the fourth quarter, big U.S. tariffs could tip that country into a second quarter in a row of declines—resulting in a recession.

It may seem that the U.S. holds all the cards on negotiations with Canada and Mexico, given their economic dependence on exports to the United States. But the exposure of companies is different and may point to another powerful player in the negotiations: U.S. companies. Based on our analysis, tariffs on U.S. imports from Mexico would likely have a disproportionately negative impact on U.S. businesses, not Mexican ones. Mexico's largest exports to the U.S. are goods produced by U.S. companies operating in Mexico, rather than Mexican companies. Autos are the largest category of Mexico's exports. Mexico's biggest exporters are automotive manufacturers headquartered in the U.S., including Ford and GM. In contrast, a lot of Mexican businesses that have large U.S. sales come from their operations located in the U.S. whose goods would not be subject to tariffs (for example, CEMEX, the big Mexican cement maker). In fact, four of the top five Mexican stocks that make up more than 50% of the MSCI Mexico Index are not likely to be directly affected by the tariffs, because they serve the Mexican market (a bank, a Coca-Cola distributor, a telecom provider, and Wal-Mart). Just the mining company, Grupo Mexico, would be directly affected.

U.S. sales exposure in the top five holdings of the MSCI Mexico Index

U.S. sales exposure in the top five holdings of the MSCI Mexico Index

This same scenario applies to Canada as well. Outside of energy exports, the largest Canadian exporters to the U. S. are auto makers including Ford, General Motors, Stellantis, Toyota, and Honda—not Canadian companies. The biggest companies in the MSCI Canada Index are banks, not directly impacted by tariffs, and energy companies facing reduced tariff rates.