The Federal Reserve continues to slow walk its efforts to push down inflation. On one hand, Chair Kevin Warsh’s rhetoric about his determination to achieve the central bank’s goal of 2% inflation is strong. In the opening remarks of his press conference following the Oct. 28 Federal Open Market Committee meeting he noted:
“…we doubled down on the 2% inflation target. We said: ‘We own it, we’re taking responsibility for it, and if you think that we’re tolerating some inflation target in the 2s, let us disabuse you of it.’”
On the other hand, actual changes in monetary policy to ensure that outcome have been very modest, with just one 25 basis-point increase in the federal funds target rate in September. This means policymakers reversed only one of 2025’s three rate cuts. As a result, the federal funds rate is currently about 75 basis points below its average for 2024 and 2025.
See more: Divided Fed Chooses Patience, Leaves Rates Unchanged
The facts underscore the disconnect between words and actions. The inflation rate has been above the Fed’s target for almost six years. Yet there is little evidence that monetary policy is currently restrictive. The unemployment rate remains low and financial conditions — while a bit tighter — are still accommodative. According to the Board of Governor’s staff models for the most recent monthly calculation for September, the positive impulse to GDP growth from financial conditions over the next year was 0.8 percentage point, down from a peak impulse of 1.1 percentage point in May.
Moreover, inflation expectations are not as quite as well-anchored as Fed officials often imply. University of Michigan and New York Fed household surveys both show elevated readings at a one-year time horizon of 4.7% and 3.9%, respectively. And the longer-term measures, while considerably lower, are still elevated at 3.5% and 3.0%.
Warsh’s framework for thinking about the linkage between economic growth, the labor market, and inflation is also concerning. Although he acknowledges that “the unemployment rate is basically running consistent with full employment,” he notes that “I don’t believe that we need to do harm to the labor markets to achieve our objective…”
If that’s the case, then what is the mechanism that pushes inflation back down to its target? And, more generally, what is his inflation framework?
Warsh’s comment suggests his strategy is to talk tough to shore up credibility. That, in turn, keeps inflation expectations well-anchored, gradually taking inflation back down to 2%.
This “immaculate disinflation” story — no pain, but gain -- has two shortcomings. First, we’ve already tried it for the several years and it hasn’t worked. Second, it is just as likely — without tighter monetary policy — that the process will run in reverse: rather than inflation falling toward well-anchored inflation expectations, inflation expectations drift up to toward actual inflation because the Fed has failed to follow through with action.
It’s become fashionable to reject the Phillips curve framework of inflation, which is that the degree of slack in the labor market has implications for the inflation outlook. And the argument is more compelling when much of the inflation pressure has come from supply shocks such as tariffs and higher energy prices. But it doesn’t follow that the labor market doesn’t matter. One just needs to recall the 2022-23 experience, when an extraordinarily tight labor market did contribute to higher wages and inflation.
It’s also fashionable to argue that monetary policy is not a good tool to address supply shocks that drive up prices, especially those generated by tariffs and energy prices that may either be short-lived or that may just be a one-time shift in the level of prices. While there is some truth in this argument, it misses a critical point. The Fed’s job is set monetary policy to help ensure that demand (ex ante) does not persistently exceed the available supply. If supply falls, making demand excessive, then prices rise. The Fed then needs to respond to equilibrate demand with supply. And, if in the process inflation expectations become less well-anchored, the demand restraint needs to be even greater to offset the impact of higher inflation expectations on wages and prices.
A December rate increase is almost certain. That will help narrow the disconnect between words and actions. But Warsh could help his cause by being more forthright about what’s required to bring inflation down to the 2% objective. That’s not forward guidance; that’s just explaining how monetary policy needs to respond to changes in the outlook for economic growth, employment, and inflation.
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