The confusion surrounding a proposed civil nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia hasn’t exactly disappeared: The White House is still claiming it depends on the country normalizing relations with Israel, even if that’s not part of the written agreement. At least Congress now has the text for review. Having seen its flaws, legislators should demand changes.
The 30-year nuclear cooperation pact would allow US companies not only to build new reactors in the kingdom, but possibly also a uranium enrichment facility — needed to produce the fissile material for a bomb. The two governments would have up to two years to decide whether an indigenous enrichment program makes sense, both commercially and in terms of US national interests. If so, the US would introduce but restrict the sensitive technology, keeping it in a metaphorical “black box” to prevent transfer to the Saudis. Congress has 90 days in session to decide whether to oppose the deal; otherwise, it’ll go into effect automatically.
Proceeding on such terms would be risky. For decades, the US and other nuclear suppliers have refused to provide customers with the technology to enrich uranium or reprocess spent fuel, precisely so they couldn’t assemble the working materials for a bomb. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has already said his nation would “have to” match Iran if it develops a nuclear weapon; the mere possibility that the Saudis might do so will encourage other countries in the region to pursue one as well. Any restricted facilities will be vulnerable to leakage, if not outright seizure.
It’s unclear why the US even needs to offer such a concession. Other suppliers aren’t threatening to provide the same access to enrichment technology; Russia and China compete mainly on cost. Besides, the Saudis have been pursuing access to US nuclear technology for nearly two decades. They’ve had plenty of time to seek alternatives if they wished. Breaking with precedent, on the other hand, could liberate US rivals to do the same. (Russia is already leading major reactor projects in Egypt and Turkey.) It would also dramatically weaken the US case against allowing Iran a domestic enrichment program.
