Breaking Bad

Advisor Perspectives welcomes guest contributions. The views presented here do not necessarily represent those of Advisor Perspectives.

TCS

This essay is excerpted from a recent version of The Credit Strategist (formerly the HCM Market Letter). To obtain the complete issue, you must subscribe directly to this publication; Please go here. The Credit Strategist is on Twitter - @credstrategist

 “Computer models alone can no longer calculate meaningful probabilities about what will happen next in the Eurozone. Instead, what really matters now in places ranging from Finland to Greece are non-quantitative issues such as political values, social cohesion and civic identity. Above all, the question of ‘credit’ is key to working out whether bonds can ever be repaid. But this is not credit in the mathematical sense by which banks have often defined (as a projected probability on a chart), but in the old fashioned, Latin – social – meaning (trust).”
Gillian Tett, Financial Times, June 5, 2012

The AMC television series Breaking Bad tells the story of Walter White, a high school chemistry teacher who has a son with cerebral palsy, an unwanted daughter on the way, a lousy second job at a car wash, and then learns that he is going to die of cancer in a few months. With nothing to lose, desperate to provide a financial future for his family, Walt comes up with a devilish plan to put his scientific skills to use as a cooker of the purest methamphetamine in the Southwest. Of course he has a brother-in-law in the DEA and a new business partner who happens to have been one of his most recalcitrant high school students who manages to wear his guilt on his sleeve as he self-medicates himself through the moral jungle of the drug underworld that he and Walt inhabit. Over the course of the series, we watch Walt transform from a man who was ostensibly good into a man who discovers the evil that lies in the heart of Everyman as he does whatever is necessary to protect his new business and provide for his family – which in his new business often includes killing people. The damage initially affects those who deserve bad things to happen to them, but inevitably it starts reaching those who don’t.1

One of the great characters in this complex drama is Walt’s wife, Skyler, who wrestles with what Walt is doing while trying to launder the money that it provides. Skyler has to provide adult supervision because one of Walt’s endearing traits is that he is an absent-minded professor and learning his criminal skills on the run. He is often his own worst enemy, which is when Skyler needs to step in and save him (and his family) from himself. At one point she delivers a line that could serve for the age we live in: “Someone has to protect this family from the man who protects this family.” With our largest business and government institutions - and the individuals running them - committing every conceivable act of legal or moral anomie, we have every right to ask who is going to protect the rest of us from those who have been entrusted with so much power and influence. The institutions that were supposed to be the lifeblood of our economy are the same institutions that inflicted the greatest harm on society – with ample assistance from the willful blindness or flat-out incompetence of the regulators. When the family has to be protected from the man who is supposed to protect the family, the family is in serious trouble.

Barclays

Are there too many laws or too many criminals? That was the question that we asked ourselves after hearing that Barclays settled claims that during the financial crisis it manipulated the price of Libor, the London interbank offered rate, a benchmark interest rate that is used globally to set the price of everything from credit card fees to mortgages and corporate bank loans. The last time Wall Street firms were involved in manipulating an instrument as essential to the workings of the financial market, it was Salomon Brothers corrupting U.S. Treasury auctions. Libor is perhaps the most basic benchmark of the banking industry; one might as well be manipulating the dollar (no doubt it is being done but has not yet been discovered yet). Most damningly, this conduct was irrefutably pre-meditated, which should subject the guilty individuals to criminal as well as civil penalties. Moreover, there were numerous people at multiple institutions involved in the daily price-settings of this benchmark interest rate so they were obviously widely known and tolerated. Some participants have expressed the view that they were trying to stabilize the financial system during the crisis. But there is abundant evidence that the individuals involved knew they were doing wrong but did it anyway, over and over again. On December 4, 2007, one Barclay’s banker wrote an email to another stating: “We are being dishonest by definition and [are] at risk of damaging our reputation in the market and with the regulators.”2  What in the world were Barclay’s compliance people doing? Even a basic email review (which in a large organization is presumably based on identifying key words in the enormous volume of email traffic that has to be reviewed) should have turned up the word “dishonest” without great difficulty. The second question is what the managers of these institutions were doing while their employees were busy breaking the law “systematically and over a period of many years, both before and during the crisis.”3
 
The resignations of Barclays Chairman Marcus Agius and its high profile CEO Bob Diamond are appropriate. If these men didn’t know what was happening on their watch, they should have known. In view of the large number of people involved in the daily price-settings, it particularly strains credulity to believe that Mr. Diamond was in the dark. Time will tell. What we do know is that a not insignificant number of Barclays’ employees were engaged in a criminal conspiracy to manipulate the financial markets. One can only hope that the U.K.’s Financial Services Authority will have the courage to do the right thing and punish all of the institutions and individuals that participated in this disgraceful chicanery to the full extent of the law. This was not a one-off event; it was a multi-year continuing conspiracy in which the illegal acts were repeated over and over again.

The spreading Wall Street stench

June was a particularly bad month for the reputation of the financial industry. First, the former head of the world’s leading management consulting firm, McKinsey & Co., Rajat Gupta, was convicted of insider trading after the jury deliberated for less than 24 hours. Then former hedge fund star Phil Falcone was finally sued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on a number of charges, the most egregious being “borrowing” over $100 million from his fund to pay his personal taxes. This was done without being disclosed at the same time Mr. Falcone was preventing his investors from withdrawing from his funds, which were experiencing huge losses and illiquidity. We have written before that while not illegal, the way that certain large investors such as Mr. Falcone and John Paulson profited from the subprime meltdown – by working with investment banks to construct structured products that they knew would fail – was a dirty business, so we can’t help but find a kind of karma in their subsequent fall from grace. Mr. Falcone was a shooting star who had “blow-up” written all over him, and the investors he took down with him should have seen his downfall coming.

Many people complain that enough isn’t being done to punish the miscreants who brought the financial world to its knees in 2008, but these prosecutions suggest that regulators and prosecutors certainly haven’t been sitting on their hands. It would undoubtedly be gratifying to see the Dick Fuld’s, Stanley O’Neil’s, Jimmy Cayne’s and Joe Cassano’s of the world dragged to the figurative gallows, but apparently, as we are reminded every day, stupidity and hubris are not crimes (although they should be when such conduct harms so many people). After all, it’s not as though evidence has emerged that any of these individuals were acting in good faith or for the greater good – they were lining their own pockets at the expense of everyone else. But if neither stupidity nor hubris is a crime, complicity in the form of silence is at the very least a moral crime and should be conduct that disqualifies those who commit it from positions of responsibility. It is no longer credible to argue that so much illegal and, if not illegal, stupid and immoral conduct could have occurred without legions of so-called highly educated (and clearly grossly overpaid) professionals looking the other way or making excuses. The people who are paraded on CNBC and elsewhere to argue that “most of the people who work on Wall Street are honest, etc.” have become nothing more than apologists for a status quo that, not to put too fine a point on it, stinks to high heaven. If these defenses were valid, wouldn’t some of these honest people have stood up and spoken out against the rampant abuse of the public trust in which the financial industry has repeatedly engaged? The reality is that they rarely speak out due to fears about their own careers or financial interests. Those that do speak out pay a price for all the cowards that don’t.


1. In many ways, Walter White’s story is an inverted version of that of another iconic television character, NYPD Blue’s Andy Sipowicz (about whom I wrote in 2005). Just as we watch Walter transform from a good man to a man capable of doing very bad things, we watched Andy Sipowicz change from an alcoholic and racist to a family man and ultimately a precinct captain who won the respect of his colleagues and superiors. NYPD Blue ran from 1993-2005, a far different period in American life than Breaking Bad’s run since 2008. Certainly one could argue that the pre-9/11 period possessed an innocence and optimism that is absent from the period that followed that terrible day.

2. See Financial Times, June 30/July 1, 2012, p. 7.

3. Ibid.