The strong performance of large-cap stocks over the past decade has left the market exceptionally top-heavy. By some measures, stock market capitalization has never been more concentrated among a handful of large stocks as today.
On December 6, the S&P 500 set the most extreme level of valuations on record, exceeding both the 1929 and 2000 market peaks on measures that we find best-correlated with actual, subsequent 10-12 year S&P 500 total returns across a century of market cycles.
On Friday December 6th, the U.S. stock market pushed to the most extreme level of valuation in U.S. history
Change is the sum of fundamental trends, the gradual elimination of accumulated extremes, and the random arrival of new shocks.
One of most dangerous habits of a speculative crowd is the tendency to use unconditional averages and unconditional probabilities regardless of how extreme market conditions have become. This is like stepping into a house with two rooms, one with the temperature at 0 degrees and one at 140 degrees, and expecting a temperature of 70 either way.
On September 18, the Federal Reserve cut the Federal funds rate, as expected, announcing at the same time that the Fed will continue to reduce its balance sheet. In my view, both of these decisions were appropriate. The Fed reduced short-term rates by 50 basis points, which was consistent with economic conditions that remain near the threshold of recession.
When you see that behavior at extreme valuations, it tends to be a sign of underlying skittishness and risk aversion. When valuations are setting record extremes because the news can’t get any better, even a slightly less optimistic outlook becomes a risk.
During each speculative run-up in asset prices – whether the dot-com bubble, the housing bubble, or more recently the rapid rise (and fall) of the stocks of electric vehicle companies – there’s typically a moment when Wall Street strategists, analysts, and investors go all-in on that theme.
The stock market is not a balloon that gets bigger when money “flows into” it. It doesn’t get smaller because money “flows out” of it. Holding the number of shares constant, the stock market gets bigger if investors pay a higher price for those shares. Period.
I may as well just say it. Based on the present combination of extreme valuations, unfavorable and deteriorating market internals, and a rare preponderance of warning syndromes in weekly and now daily data, my impression is that the speculative market advance since 2009 ended last week.
With the market seeming to skate by the trap door of extreme valuations and unfavorable internals without consequence, the push to new highs in the past few weeks has created the impression of a runaway advance.
As of last week, the total return of the S&P 500 was even with 3-month Treasury bill returns since the valuation peak of January 2022, more than two years ago. In our view, investors continue to “grasp at the suds of yesterday’s bubble,” ignoring extreme valuations, lopsided bullish sentiment, emerging pressure on profit margins, economic conditions at the border of recession...
Based on the valuation measures we find best-correlated with actual subsequent S&P 500 total returns across a century of market cycles, the stock market presently stands at valuation extremes matched only twice in U.S. financial history.
If you’re losing your mind and plagued by fear of missing out, it might be that you’re best served with some passive investment exposure in your portfolio. Not because it will do well, at least not in our estimation, but so you don’t lose your mind.
As I observed last month, the strongest stock market returns in the coming decade, perhaps longer, are likely to emerge during advances in the S&P 500 that attempt to catch up with the cumulative return of risk-free Treasury bills.
The strongest stock market returns in the coming decade, perhaps longer, are likely to emerge during advances in the S&P 500 that attempt to catch up with the cumulative return of risk-free Treasury bills.
It’s worth noting that despite the recent market advance, our own investment discipline, and even Treasury bills, have outpaced the S&P 500 and Nasdaq 100 during this period, with less volatility.
For the better part of two years, investors have been primed with hope of a “Fed pivot” that will presumably restore easy monetary policy and supportive conditions for the financial markets.
A recent survey asking economists about the probability of recession next quarter shows a retreat in expectations from a high of 47 percent at the end of 2022 to just 34 percent, according to the Philadelphia Federal Reserve.
Value-conscious, historically-informed, full-cycle investors place a great deal of emphasis on the relationship between the price an investor pays today and the cash flows they can expect to receive in the future. The reason is simple.
On the interest rate front, the Federal funds rate is now close to systematic benchmarks that have historically been consistent with prevailing core inflation, nominal GDP growth, and unemployment.
There is a particular “setup” that we’ve historically found to be associated with abrupt “air pockets” and “free falls” in the S&P 500. It combines hostile conditions in all three features most central to our investment discipline: rich valuations, unfavorable market internals, and extreme overextension.
Bull markets and bear markets can’t be identified in real-time – only in hindsight. More importantly, the return/risk profile of a “bull market” or a “bear market” can change dramatically depending on whether valuations are consistent with the beginning of a market cycle or the end of one.
Most of us spent moments of our childhood, crayon in hand, connecting numbered dots that gradually revealed a picture that we couldn’t deduce simply by looking at the separate dots. With experience, we got better at looking at those isolated dots and mentally connecting them into a coherent “gestalt.”
Amid the overabundance of economic opinion, unexamined clichés, and unverified assertions, and nutrient-free word salad dispensed by talking heads on television, market observers, and even Federal Reserve officials, I often wonder how many of them have ever taken the time to carefully examine historical data.
The simplest thing that can be said about current financial market and banking conditions is this: the unwinding of this Fed-induced, yield-seeking speculative bubble is proceeding as one would expect, and it’s not over by a longshot.
The extreme “tail” risk ahead may be disorienting.
The problem with speculation is that there’s usually a gap between the underlying risk and the inevitable outcome.
As of Friday, December 16, the S&P 500 Index is down -19.7% from the most speculative level of valuations in U.S. history – exceeding even the 1929 and 2000 extremes, based on the valuation measures we find best-correlated with actual subsequent market returns in cycles across history.
We continue to believe that a value-conscious, risk-managed, full-cycle discipline, focused on the combination of valuations and market internals, will be essential in navigating market volatility in the years ahead.
Two aspects of the financial markets operate simultaneously. Emphatically, they do not operate alternately, but simultaneously. One aspect is driven entirely by arithmetic. Every security is a claim to some long-term stream of cash flows that will be delivered to the holder, or series of holders, over time.
At the beginning of 2022, our most reliable stock market valuation measures stood at record levels, beyond even their 1929 and 2000 extremes. The 10-year Treasury yield was at 1.5%, the 30-year Treasury bond yield was at 1.9%, and Treasury bill yields were just 0.06%. By our estimates, that combination produced the most negative expected return for a conventional passive investment portfolio in U.S. history.
Surveying the current condition of the financial markets, we presently observe a combination of still historically-extreme valuations, rising yet still only normalizing interest rates, measurably inadequate risk-premiums in both equities and bonds, and ragged, unfavorable market internals, suggesting continued risk-aversion among investors.
After more than 40 years of work in the financial markets, studying all the data I could get my hands on, I’ve found it to be universally true that those who argue “history doesn’t matter” have never actually studied history.
Lao Tzu wrote, “A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step.”
A fascinating aspect of the financial markets is that long-term returns are driven almost entirely by math, while short-term returns are driven almost entirely by psychology.
The most challenging financial event for investors in the coming decade will be the repricing of securities to valuations that imply adequate long-term returns, following more than a decade of reckless and intentional Fed-induced yield-seeking speculation.
The expected return from a roulette spin is negative: -5.26%.
Why is it so hard to accept that speculative bubbles can burst?
In an economy where the Fed has lost every systematic tether to common sense, empirical evidence, and concern for financial stability, it’s worth beginning this first market comment of 2022 by recalling the ways we’ve adapted in order to navigate that environment.
Whether investors are ready or not, global monetary tightening cycles are fast approaching.
There are certain features of valuation, investor psychology, and price behavior that emerge, to one degree or another, when the fear of missing out becomes particularly extreme and the focus of speculation becomes particularly narrow. We’ve suddenly hit a motherlode of those conditions. Emphatically, this is not a forecast. It's a statement about current, observable conditions.
Speculative psychology is the only thing standing between an hypervalued market that continues to advance and a hypervalued market that drops like a rock. Our best gauge of that psychology - the uniformity of market internals - remains divergent enough to keep market conditions in a trap-door situation.
Among the illusions encouraged by every speculative bubble is the idea that wealth is embodied in the prices of securities – that higher prices inherently represent greater “wealth.” The fact is that every security is, at base, a claim to some future stream of cash flows that will be delivered into the hands of investors over time.
Among the most persistent questions I hear is why we don’t just adapt to the reality that the Federal Reserve will never again “allow” the market to experience a serious decline. The problem with this view is that it rests on the premise that Federal Reserve policy supports the market in a clear-cut and mechanical way, when its effectiveness actually relies on the speculative psychology of investors.
A remarkable feature of extended bull markets is that investors come to believe – even in the face of extreme valuations – that the world has changed in ways that make steep market losses and extended periods of poor returns impossible.
The title of this comment may seem odd, given that – as I write this on July 14, 2021 – the S&P 500 is at a record high.
Coherent thinking is interested in how things are related; where they come from, where they go, and the mechanisms by which they affect each other.
