A Brexit vote is hanging in the balance ahead of the UK’s June 23 referendum on membership of the EU. The race will have far-reaching implications, even if the UK decides to stay.

In recent weeks, the European Central Bank (ECB) has talked openly about helicopter money, price-level targeting and debt monetization. None of these are imminent. But against a backdrop of high debt and weak growth, further steps into experimental monetary policy terrain look inevitable.

Who’d be a central banker? Last December, European Central Bank (ECB) president Mario Draghi was widely criticized for leading markets up the garden path and delivering a lukewarm package of stimulus measures.

Britain’s debate on staying in the European Union has moved into overdrive, weighing heavily on the pound. If Britain does vote to leave, the impact on the UK economy could be profound—and felt well beyond its borders.

Yesterday’s referendum has pushed Greece closer to euro-area exit, which would plunge the region into uncharted waters. But policymakers have powerful tools to combat contagion and prevent a Greek accident from triggering a wider recession.

Greece’s five-year debt crisis is escalating fast. A default on the IMF now looks almost certain and the country is taking a big step toward a possible exit from the euro area. What really matters now, though, is the impact on other countries—and how the ECB will respond.

Greece and its euro-area partners have yet to reach a deal to secure long-delayed bailout funds. Without these funds, Greece could run out of money in a matter of weeks, raising the real prospect of a default on payments due to its official creditors.

There are good reasons to be concerned about the medium-term outlook for euro-area growth. But that doesn’t mean the business cycle is dead. We think the conditions for a cyclical rebound in regional growth are currently better than they’ve been at any time since the global financial crisis.

Greece is holding early parliamentary elections on January 25. A victory for the anti-austerity Syriza party would probably trigger tense negotiations with the country?s official lenders and fresh volatility in Greek government bond markets. But the expected launch of ECB QE should mitigate contagion to the rest of the periphery.

December?s negative inflation print has led to a cacophony of headlines proclaiming that the euro area has finally succumbed to deflation. We think concerns about modest declines in consumer prices are overdone. But the structural weakness of nominal growth remains a major concern.

When Mario Draghi pledged to do whatever it takes to save the euro in July 2012, nobody expected things to change so quickly. Peripheral bond markets have since turned around sharply, supporting the European economic recovery. But can the improvements be sustained after countries exit their bailouts?

Evolving economic challenges are transforming central banking around the world. The new monetary-policy doctrine is likely to put greater emphasis on asset-price developments. But, without a true monetary anchor, central banks could still risk a repeat of the recent boom/bust cycle.

Many pundits believe the German federal election on September 22 will prove a turning point in the sovereign debt-crisis. We are less convinced. Barring a massive shock, Angela Merkel is set to be endorsed as Chancellor for another four years. If this is the case, Germany is unlikely to depart much from the playbook that has served it well in recent years and which may now be delivering positive results.

Political upheaval in Portugal has thrown the spotlight on the European Central Banks (ECBs) bond-purchase programme, known as Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs). Many are asking whether the ECB is ready to support the market if yields rise further. And if not, why not?

Disappointing April data suggest that the ECB is set to cut the refinancing rate at Thursdays Council meeting. This is likely to have limited economic impact but could encourage expectations of more creative policy action later, helping to take some upward pressure off the euro.

The European Unions last-minute deal with Cyprus has headed off bankruptcy for now, but comes at a heavy price for uninsured bank depositors. Meanwhile, the move to impose losses on private creditors and growing complacency among policymakers could be storing up trouble for the future.

We expect little change in UK fiscal policy in Wednesdays budget. Instead the Chancellor George Osborne may try to nudge the Bank of England towards more aggressive monetary easing, putting further pressure on the pound.

Today's PMI data point to a deepening recession in France at a time when Germany is showing tentative signs of life. Is the euro crisis exposing the weaknesses of the French economic model?

In a speech last week, British Prime Minister David Cameron raised the possibility that the UK might push the nuclear button and leave the European Union. We think both the threat and consequences of such a move have been exaggerated. The most striking aspect of Mr Camerons much-postponed speech on Europe last week was his promise to hold a referendum on the UKs membership of the European Union (EU) by the end of 2017. Such a vote, he said, would follow a new settlement to hand powers back to national governments.

Jean-Claude Juncker's view that the euro is "dangerously high" isn't shared by the European Central Bank (ECB). As long as this is the case, the single currency may continue to defy fundamentals and act as an unwelcome headwind for an economy still struggling to break out of recession.

Bank of England governor-elect, Mark Carney, has raised hopes that the central bank may soon switch to a nominal GDP target. In our view, the costs outweigh the benefits, but the attractions of a radical new approach will grow if the economy remains stuck in the doldrums.

Even by the standards of the sovereign-debt crisis, the provisional agreement reached yesterday by euro-area finance ministers and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on a second Greek rescue package looks like a messy fudge. It is clear that Greece's euro-area partners are determined to avoid a near-term euro-area exit, but a long-term solution will require a much more effective growth strategy.

Despite the Greek government's best efforts, last night's meeting of euro-area finance ministers failed to approve the release of new funding. We think it's only a matter of time before Greece gets its money. But the latest delay reflects deep disagreement about how to reduce current unsustainable debt levels.

European Central Bank (ECB) president Mario Draghi's promise to do "whatever it takes to preserve the euro" and create a new bond-purchase program has been positive for market sentiment. But the program also carries real dangers if it breaks the fragile consensus on the board of the ECB and eases the pressure on governments to create a "genuine" economic and monetary union.

The UK is celebrating a near three-year low in consumer price inflation, but we think the Bank of England (BOE) should be more worried about the role that money and credit play in the inflation process.

A collapse in direct investment income was the main factor behind the UK's record second-quarter current account deficit. It's too early to know whether this represents a permanent shift. But, if it does, it would make rebalancing the economy more difficult and have important implications for the pound.

There has been some speculation that the European Central Bank (ECB) may soon push its deposit rate into negative territory. We think a cut in the deposit rate would be a poor substitute for measures aimed directly at repairing the monetary transmission mechanism in the troubled peripheral countries. But there's a case for reducing the deposit rate, and one which we think is worth rehearsing.

Recent German data show clearly that the sovereign-debt crisis is starting to bite. This might help explain why the government has given a green light to the European Central Banks (ECBs) new sovereign-bond purchase program. It may also indicate a more lenient approach to Greeceat least for the time being.

Capital flight from Spain is accelerating. As foreign investors and banks pull massive sums out of the country, policymakers look powerless to stop it. So far this year, there has been a net capital outflow from Spain of 220 billion. We can identify three main channels: foreign investors sold 84 billion of Spanish securities; foreign banks withdrew 91 billion of loans or deposits from Spain; and banks located in Spain shifted 61 billion of deposits abroad.

Today, New Democracy (ND) leader Antonis Samaras will try to form a government. If he succeeds, an immediate disaster scenario will have been avoided. The question is: for how long? Yesterday, the centre-right ND party narrowly defeated the radical left wing Syriza party in the second Greek election. A coalition between ND and the center-left Pasok party would command enough seats in parliament to give it a small working majority (a target that the two parties just missed in the May election).

A credible recapitalization of the Spanish banks is now a necessary, though not sufficient, condition to stabilize markets. But there is disagreement about how to achieve thisincreasing the risk of a damaging standoff and further volatility in European sovereign-debt markets.Spain was always going to be a key battleground in the sovereign-debt crisis. At 1.1 trillion, Spains economy accounts for 11% of euro-area output. It is almost twice as big as the combined economies of Greece, Portugal and Ireland. More pertinently, it has total banking assets of 3.7 trillion.

The stagnation of consumer spending and the weakness of wage growth in Germany over the past decade deprived Greece and other peripheral European countries of their most important trading partner. Expansionary German policies could help correct imbalances in the euro area, and remove the need for bailouts.

The sell off in Greece this week has taught the country a tough lesson in the urgency of getting its debt under control. Although several risks remain and Greece may eventually require outside support, we believe it will not be allowed to fail, largely because of the risk of contagion to other weak euro-area countries.