Soaring debt/GDP ratios in previously sacrosanct AAA countries have made low cost funding increasingly a function of central banks as opposed to private market investors. Both the lower quality and lower yields of such previously sacrosanct debt represent a potential breaking point in our now 40-year-old global monetary system. Bond investors should favor quality and clean dirty shirt sovereigns (U.S., Mexico and Brazil), for example, as well as emphasize intermediate maturities that gradually shorten over the next few years.

The current acceleration of credit via central bank policies will likely produce a positive rate of real economic growth this year for most developed countries, but the structural distortions brought about by zero bound interest rates will limit that growth and induce serious risks in future years. Gradually higher rates of inflation should be the result of QE policies and zero bound yields. Focus on securities with shorter durations bonds with maturities in the 5-year range and stocks paying dividends that offer 3%4% yields. Real assets/commodities should occupy an increasing percentage.

When interest rates cannot be lowered further or risk spreads significantly compressed, the momentum begins to shift, gradually yields moving mildly higher and spreads stabilizing or moving slightly wider. In such a mildly reflating world, unless you want to earn an inflation-adjusted return of minus 2%-3% as offered by Treasury bills, then you must take risk in some form. We favor high quality, shorter duration and inflation-protected bonds; dividend paying stocks with a preference for developing over developed markets; and inflation-sensitive, supply-constrained commodity products.

Over the past 30 years, an offensively minded Federal Reserve and their global counterparts were printing money, lowering yields and bringing forward a false sense of monetary wealth. Successful investing in a deleveraging, low interest rate environment will require defensive in addition to offensive skills. The PIMCO defensive strategy playbook: Recognize zero bound limits and systemic debt risk in global financial markets. Accept financial repression but avoid its impact when and where possible. Emphasize income we believe to be relatively reliable/safe; seek consistent alpha.

When interest rates approach zero they may transition from historically stimulative to potentially destimulative/regressive influences. Recent central bank behavior, including that of the U.S. Fed, provides assurances that short/intermediate yields will not change, and therefore bond prices are not likely threatened on the downside. Most short to intermediate Treasury yields are dangerously close to the zero-bound which imply limited potential room, if any, for price appreciation. We can't put $100 trillion of credit in a system-wide mattress, but we can move in that direction by delevering.

The New Normal, previously believed to be bell-shaped and thin-tailed in its depiction of growth probability and financial market outcomes, appears to be morphing into a world of fat-tailed, almost bimodal outcomes. A new duality credit and zero-bound interest rate risk, characterizes the financial markets of 2012, offering the fat left-tailed possibility of unforeseen policy delevering or the fat right-tailed possibility of central bank inflationary expansion. Until the outcome becomes clear, investors should consider ways to hedge their bets.

Neither the U.S. economy nor U.S. stock indexes will benefit from the euros decline. A declining euro means a rising dollar in relative terms, so our exports will necessarily become less competitive. During the Great Depression, the country that devalued its currency the quickest and the most was the country that was least affected by depression and that recovered the fastest. This truism will aid Euroland, and hinder the U.S. recovery.

Investors should recognize that Eurolands problems are global and secular in nature; it will be years before Euroland and developed nations in total can constructively escape from their straitjacket of debt. Global growth will likely remain stunted, interest rates artificially low and investors continually disenchanted with returns that fail to match expectations. Investors should consider risk assets in emerging economies, and bonds in the strongest developed economies, where the steep yield curve may offer opportunities for capital gains and potentially higher total returns.

Growth is the commodity that the world is short of at the moment. Once interest rates inch close to zero and discounted future cash flows are elevated in price, it's difficult to generate much more return if economic growth doesn't follow. Equity markets should be dominated by dividend yields and the return of capital via share buybacks, as opposed to growth. In fixed income assets, we suggest that portfolios should avoid longer dated issues where inflation premiums dominate performance.

Long-term profits cannot ultimately grow unless they are partnered with near equal benefits for labor. There is only a New Normal economy at best and a global recession at worst to look forward to in future years. If global policymakers could focus on structural as opposed to cyclical financial solutions, New Normal growth as opposed to recession might be possible.

The concept of showering money over national economies to combat deflation has been an accepted principle of monetarism for decades. A helicopter, however, is not your average aeroplane, and the usual laws of aerodynamics do not necessarily apply in all cases. Similarly monetary policy at the zero interest rate bound introduces a new dynamic that may conflict or even reverse standard logic that lower interest rates across the sovereign yield curve are everywhere and always stimulative to economic growth.

Liquidity concerns may affect all European peripheral bond markets unless the European Central Bank counters the rush for the exits with an enlarged daily checkbook. In the U.S., discord between rich and poor has led to lower, not higher, Treasury yields as approaching recessionary winds force the Fed and private investors to favor bonds. We prefer investing in the cleaner dirty shirt countries of Canada, Australia, Mexico and Brazil, along with non-dollar currencies that have strong trade ties with the Asian continent.

The U.S. has averted a debt crisis, but there remains a stain on our reputation. Nothing in the Congressional compromise reached over the weekend makes a significant dent in our $1.5 trillion deficit. In addition to an existing nearly $10 trillion of outstanding Treasury debt, the U.S. has a near unfathomable $66 trillion of future liabilities at net present cost. Aside from outright default, there are numerous ways a government can reduce its future liabilities. They include balancing the budget, unexpected inflation, currency depreciation and financial repression.

The past several decades have witnessed an erosion of our manufacturing base in exchange for a reliance on wealth creation via financial assets. Fiscal balance alone will not likely produce 20 million jobs over the next decade. Government must take a leading role in job creation. A growing number of skeptics wonder whether college is worth the time or the cost.

If the government is going to artificially repress yield, then focus on the parts of a bond that are less repressed! Rather than outright default, many countries attempt rather successfully to keep nominal interest rates lower than would otherwise prevail. Over the long term, this ?financial repression? results in a transfer of wealth from savers to borrowers. Investors shouldn?t give their money away, and at the moment, the duration component of a bond portfolio comes close to doing just that ? because it doesn?t yield enough relative to inflation.

Low policy rates and the increasing negative real yields that they engender as inflation accelerates represent an immediate threat to investment portfolios. Bond prices dont necessarily have to go down for savers to get skunked during a process of debt liquidation. PIMCO advocates a renewed vigilance, stressing bond market alternatives available globally, including developing/emerging market debt at higher yields denominated in non-dollar currencies.

Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security now account for 44% of total federal spending and are steadily rising. Previous Congresses (and Administrations) have relied on the assumption that we can grow our way out of this onerous debt burden. Unless entitlements are substantially reformed, the U.S. will likely default on its debt; not in conventional ways, but via inflation, currency devaluation and low to negative real interest rates.

A successful handoff from public to private credit creation has yet to be accomplished, and it is that handoff that ultimately will determine the outlook for real growth and stability. Because quantitative easing has affected all risk spreads, the withdrawal of nearly $1.5 trillion in annualized check writing may have dramatic consequences. Who will buy Treasuries when the Fed doesn?t? The question really is at what yield, and what are the price repercussions if the adjustments are significant.

Money has become the economic and political wedge for profound changes in American society. Perhaps the most deceptive policy tool to lessen debt loads is the ?negative? or exceedingly low real interest rate that central banks impose on savers and debt holders. Old-fashioned gilts and Treasury bonds may need to be ?exorcised? from model portfolios and replaced with more attractive alternatives both from a risk and a reward standpoint.

American politicians and citizens alike have no clear vision of the costs of a seemingly perpetual trillion-dollar annual deficit. Meanwhile, policy stimulus is focused on maintaining current consumption as opposed to making the United States more competitive in the global marketplace. Dollar depreciation will sap the purchasing power of U.S. consumers, as well as the global valuation of dollar denominated assets.

The global economy is suffering from a lack of aggregate demand. In the U.S. and Euroland, many policies only temporarily bolster consumption while failing to address the fundamental problem of developed economies: Job growth is moving inexorably to developing economies because they are more competitive. Unless developed economies learn to compete the old-fashioned way ? by making more goods and making them better ? the smart money will continue to move offshore to Asia, Brazil and their developing economy counterparts, both in asset and in currency space.

The Fed's announcement of a renewed commitment to quantitative easing has been well-telegraphed, and the market's reaction is likely to be subdued. We are in a 'liquidity trap,' where interest rates or trillions in asset purchases may not stimulate borrowing or lending because consumer demand is just not there. The Fed's announcement will likely signify the end of a great 30-year bull market in bonds and the necessity for bond managers and, yes, equity managers to adjust to a new environment.

The economic drivers that once pumped up asset prices and favored the production of paper over commodities are now retrograde. The reality during Stan Druckenmiller's 'old normal' was that prosperity and overconsumption were driven by asset inflation that in turn was correlated with leverage and interest rates. Investors are now faced with bonds yielding 2.5 percent and stocks staring straight into new normal real growth rates of 2 percent or less. There is no 8 percent there for pension funds. There are no stocks for the long run at 12 percent returns.

Americans now know that housing prices don't always go up, and that they can in fact go down by 30-50 percent in a few short years. Having grown accustomed to a housing market aided and abetted by Uncle Sam, the habit cannot be broken by going cold turkey into the camp of private lending. Private mortgage lenders will demand extraordinary down payments, impeccable credit histories and significantly higher yields than what markets grew used to over the past several decades.

The economy's New Normal of deleveraging, reregulation and deglobalization will neither be aided nor abetted by a slower-growing population, or by cyclical policy errors that thrust Keynesian consumption remedies on a declining consumer base. Current deficit spending that seeks to maintain an artificially high percentage of consumer spending can be compared to flushing money down an economic toilet. It would be far better to create and mimic other government industrial policies aimed at infrastructure, clean energy, more relevant education and less costly health care services.

The lack of global aggregate demand ? resulting from too much debt in parts of the global economy and not enough in others ? is the essence of the problem. The solution, according to William Gross, may be to add the letter 'R' to your name (as in Roubini, Reinhart, Rogoff, and Rosenberg) or, better yet, to embrace the words 'New Normal.'

Fiscal tightening and budget conservatism may have come too late for Greece and its global lookalikes. Continued deficit spending may be an exorbitant privilege extended to only a few. Caught in the middle are many developed countries that will likely face muted growth rates and a continued bumpy journey toward their destinations. Investors must respect this rather tortuous journey in the months and years ahead for what it is: a deleveraging process based upon too much debt and too little growth to service it.

If a chef were to concoct a gourmet investment recipe, he would likely blend a teaspoon of intelligence with a tablespoon of common sense. The rating agencies in recent years have displayed little of either. In addition, they have brazenly sold their reputations for unbiased judgment to the very companies they purported to judge. Those looking to profit at their expense will dismiss them. They no longer serve a valid purpose for investment companies that are free of regulatory mandates, and that can think with a teaspoon of intelligence and a tablespoon of common sense.

Prudent lending must be directed not only towards sovereigns that can escape a debt trap, but ones that can do so with a minimum of reflationary consequences and currency devaluation. A unit of quality credit spread will do better than a unit of duration. Rates face a future bear market if global reflation is successful as central banks eventually normalize quantitative easing policies and 0 percent yields. Spreads in appropriate sovereign and corporate credits are a better bet as long as global contagion is contained. If not, a rush to the safety of Treasury bills lies ahead.

A lack of global aggregate demand, brought by twenty years of accelerated globalization, is the fundamental economic problem of our age. Many states have used government debt to make up for shortfalls in aggregate demand. But as the crises in Dubai, Iceland, Ireland and Greece show, not every state is able to pay off its new debt load. Investors should therefore concentrate on states that have lower credit or inflationary risk, such as Germany and Canada, and avoid higher-risk states such as Greece and the U.K.

Bill Gross reviews two recent analyses (the Reinhart/Rogoff book and the McKinsey study) of the plight of economies faced with large fiscal deficits. He says that these support PIMCO?s view of the Ne