According to conventional economic thinking, incoming British Prime Minister Liz Truss’s economic experiment with borrowing and spending will produce disaster.
As is the case with Evergreen, our partner firm Gavekal encourages an environment of “opinion exchanges”. In the latter case, much of that stems from the inherent philosophical divergences regarding economics and politics between its three co-founders.
According to conventional wisdom, US President-elect Biden will find himself immediately paralyzed because Republicans will follow the same obstructionist playbook they used to sabotage Barack Obama’s administration. But there are five new features of US political dynamics that this argument has overlooked.
The proposed sum for the recovery fund proposed by French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel is small change in an era when politicians and central bankers conjure up trillions almost daily. But, if adopted, the proposal might be remembered as the moment when Europe became a genuine political federation.
Based on China’s experience with COVID-19, the fiscal cost of comprehensive compensation for lost income could reach 10% of annual GDP, and as much as 25% of GDP in the US and Europe if the epidemic turns out to be worse there, which now looks likely. These may seem like mind-boggling sums, but they can be financed in several ways.
Callous as it may sound, the economic and political impact of the coronavirus pandemic will ultimately be determined by the epidemiological and clinical data. Fortunately, in this case, the relevant statistical trends are developing in a much less alarming way than panicked media headlines might suggest.
With the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union now set to take effect on January 31, 2020, the most important challenge facing UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson is negotiating his country's new relationship with the bloc. He has every incentive to keep that process as non-controversial as possible.
If Boris Johnson wins the United Kingdom's upcoming vote, as expected, Brexit will go ahead and cause the country long-term damage. But for the next several years, almost nothing about the UK's relationship with the European Union is likely to change, because Johnson can – and almost certainly will – extend the transition period.
Central bankers have been the first to recognize that the effectiveness of monetary policy in managing demand and stabilizing economic cycles has reached its limits. The problem is that many politicians and academic economists remain in denial.
Despite all the lurid headlines about the trade war causing a recession in the United States or some kind of collapse in China and its Asian neighbors, recent economic data reveal a very different picture: the main victim has been Europe. But, fortunately for the European economy, overdependence on foreign trade is not the whole story.
Political betting markets now put the chance of a no-deal Brexit at roughly one-third. But, regardless of the reckless promises to Conservative Europhobes that made Boris Johnson prime minister, an orderly, negotiated Brexit will be the favored option for a political libertine whose only consistent principle has been inconsistency.
Many economists have become convinced that a recession in the United States is now overdue, if not immediately then surely before the 2020 presidential election. But US recessions since the end of World War II have generally resulted from three causes, none of which is currently present.
Fanatical Brexiteers argue that a UK prime minister genuinely determined to deliver a no-deal Brexit could, and should, go nuclear: suspend parliament and refuse to call MPs back until after the October 31 deadline, when Brexit will happen automatically. The problem for them is that the UK isn't Zimbabwe or Venezuela.
Sooner or later, some political shock will disrupt the current happy balance of robust global growth and low inflation, as US President Donald Trump’s trade wars and oil sanctions almost did last year. But until such a shock actually happens, investors can sit back and enjoy their porridge just the way they like it.
A no-deal disaster is still theoretically possible when the next Brexit deadline arrives on April 12. But a much longer extension is almost certain, now that the principle of a potentially endless negotiation has prevailed.
British Prime Minister Theresa May’s strategy of threatening a no-deal Brexit requires a hard deadline that forces her opponents to capitulate. Without that, “running down the clock” becomes “kicking the can down the road,” which more accurately reflects May’s paradoxical combination of robotic inflexibility and exasperating indecisiveness.
In a world where “nobody knows anything,” investors may be no better than film-studio moguls at predicting the future. If so, then markets, instead of being predictive, become increasingly reactive, simply extrapolating recent events.
As matters stand today, a new British referendum on leaving the European Union would produce a clear majority for remaining a member, regardless of how the votes were counted or the questions were asked. And with the only two Brexit options set to be rejected next month, the questions are increasingly likely to be asked.
Donald Trump's negotiating style – “shout loudly and carry a white flag” – may seem incoherent and dishonest, but it has been spectacularly successful for him. And he's about to use it again with China.
If voters rejected “no deal” in favor of no Brexit in a new referendum, May’s hardline opponents would be silenced, and her position as Prime Minister would be secured until the 2022 election. Why would she not seize this chance?
In handicapping the US-China conflict, Keynesian demand management is a better guide than comparative advantage. In principle, China can avoid any damage at all from US tariffs simply by responding with a full-scale Keynesian stimulus.
Why does US President Donald Trump keep making empty threats against other countries? While his detractors think he is simply a braggart, a fool, and an ignoramus, there could be a less unflattering, though equally depressing, explanation.
The consequences of the Brexit self-delusion are now becoming obvious, as Britain’s government finds itself unable to get a parliamentary majority for any realistic plan to leave the EU. If this situation persists, Britain will have only one alternative: another referendum to reconsider the impossible result of the 2016 vote.
The opposite of populist nationalism is not globalist elitism; it is economic realism. And in the end, countries such as Britain, the United States, and now Italy will learn the hard way that reality always eventually wins.
The sanctions against Iran reinstated by US President Donald Trump raise two all-important questions that have no convincing answers. But they also raise a third question, about which financial markets are likely to be wrong.
With economic conditions returning more or less to normal around the world after a decade of financial crises, nationalist populism is now seen as the biggest threat to global recovery. But is it possible that this consensus has emerged just as the populist wave has crested?
Economists may warn that the combination of Trump’s protectionism, big tax cuts, and uncontrolled government borrowing, coming at a time when the US economy is already near full employment, will ultimately fuel inflationary pressure. But financial markets simply do not believe this message.
Did February’s equity-price reversal mark the end of the bull market, or was it just a temporary correction? In addressing this question, one must look not just at the stock market, but also at oil prices, long-term US interest rates, and currencies.
If a hard Brexit is economically unacceptable to British business and Parliament, a soft Brexit is politically unacceptable to EU leaders, and a fake Brexit is unacceptable to almost everyone, just one alternative remains: no Brexit. That would mean revoking Britain’s withdrawal notice under Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union.
What many analysts still see as a temporary bubble, pumped up by artificial and unsustainable monetary stimulus, is maturing into a structural expansion of economic activity, profits, and employment that probably has many more years to run. There are at least four reasons for such optimism.
With talks on the UK's withdrawal from the EU stalled, negotiators should shift to the temporary “transition” Prime Minister Theresa May officially requested last month. Above all, the negotiators should focus immediately on the British budget contributions that will be required to make an orderly transition possible.
Last year’s "multi-crisis" in the EU – including Brexit, refugees, “illiberal democracy” in Hungary and Poland, and the still-unresolved euro crisis – has produced a convergence of opportunities. With Germany's election over, European leaders no longer have an excuse for inaction while they wait for voters’ next rebuff.
The British political establishment is now converging on a form of Brexit that will satisfy neither the "Leave" nor the "Remain" camp. With this depressing prospect setting in, some are starting to wonder what it would take for Britons to change their minds about leaving the European Union.
Since the global financial crisis began a decade ago, there has been no shortage of useful ideas for ameliorating economic conditions and alleviating public resentment. The real question is why so few of them have been implemented.
In the wake of the UK's snap election, how long Theresa May will survive as prime minister is impossible to predict. But in trying to anticipate the outcome of the Brexit negotiations, the questions that matter no longer have much to do with May’s political survival.
Britain, France, the United States – which is the odd one out politically? The answer seems obvious. Last year’s Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom and the election of Donald Trump in the United States were the twin symbols of populist revolt against global elites. In Emmanuel Macron, France, by contrast, has just elected as its president the quintessential “Davos Man” – a proudly globalist technocrat identified with his country’s most elitist financial, administrative, and educational institutions.
The election called by UK Prime Minister Theresa May for June will transform Britain’s politics and its relationship with Europe, but not necessarily in the way implied by a large majority for May’s Conservatives. Britain’s pro-European progressive forces could still snatch victory from the jaws of defeat for three related reasons.
The Dutch are famous for building dykes that hold back the tides and storms sweeping across the Atlantic. Have the Dutch now done it again, stopping the wave of populist politics that has been threatening to engulf Europe?
Ongoing congressional gridlock will be the key to continued buoyancy in US equity markets, says Gavekal Dragonomics’ Anatole Kaletsky. It’s when Trump’s agenda starts to be implemented that the euphoria will wane.
The eurozone could surprise everyone with a dramatic recovery this year, says Gavekal Dragonomics’ Anatole Kaletsky, so long as populists stay out of power.
The former UK leader’s recent call for voters to rethink leaving the EU is an Emperor’s New Clothes moment. Blair is now an unpopular figure, but his voice is loud enough to carry above the crowd of flatterers assuring Prime Minister Theresa May that her naked gamble with Britain’s future is clad in democratic finery.
Donald Trump’s economic policies are likely to produce higher US inflation and interest rates, and more dollar appreciation, than financial markets expect. But Europe could stabilize after France's presidential election, ushering in a period of healthy economic growth and strong financial performance.
Donald Trump’s presidency is a symptom of an interregnum between economic orders – a period that will result in a new balance between state and market. While his administration’s economic policies are unlikely to provide the right answer, they may at least show the world what not to do.
When a particular model of capitalism is working successfully, material progress relieves political pressures. But, as we saw in 2016, when the economy fails – and the failure is not just a transient phase but a symptom of deep contradictions – capitalism’s disruptive social side effects can turn politically toxic.
With the Republican Party in full control of the US government, fiscal stimulus will boost economic growth in the short term. But enacting large tax cuts and boosting public spending in an economy already nearing full employment implies accelerating inflation, higher interest rates, or probably some combination of the two.