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Higher oil prices make dramatic news.
In 2007, we saw a 50% jump from $70 to $100 per barrel from mid-August to the end of the year. Only during three other times – the Iranian Revolution (1979), Iraq’s invasion of Iran (1980), and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait (1990) – was there a price increase of this magnitude.
Oil prices affect consumers on a daily basis, at the gas pump and in their home heating bills. No other goods or services have such an impact. Yet, for all its visibility, there are widespread misconceptions about what determines the price of oil and how it affects the economy.
In this article, we look at what drives the price of oil, the prospects for 2008 and the implications of these forecasts. In particular, we examine the 2007 price jump in order to see whether it is likely to be permanent.
Our analysis draws upon the research of Philip Verleger, an expert on energy prices and the author of numerous articles on the oil markets. (We interviewed Verleger on Jan. 30, 2008.)
Light and Sweet or Heavy and Sour?
When we hear that oil is at $80 per barrel, we assume that is the price in the U.S. market. This is not the case. The quoted price for oil is based on WTI, or West Texas Intermediate. This is a “light sweet” crude oil, low in sulfur content and easy to refine. But oil comes in more than one flavor, and WTI represents at most a third of US oil consumption. The majority of the oil refined in the U.S. is “heavy and sour,” driven in part by Canadian and Saudi supply. This oil is considerably cheaper – about $15 per barrel cheaper – than WTI, but costs more to refine.
Using WTI as a benchmark for oil prices is like using the price of an expensive French wine to gauge the price of the overall wine market.
Historically, WTI and sour crude prices have been closely correlated, so the quoted price of oil was an accurate indicator of the market. However, this relationship has started to break down, primarily because of new environmental regulations which limit the amount of sulfur in diesel fuel. These regulations have placed a premium on sweet crude that has caused price movements to diverge.
Oil in 2006 and a Year Later
To understand 2007 price jump, look at oil prices in 2006. The chart below presents the data for these two years:
Oil prices followed nearly identical paths until mid-August, when we saw the beginning of the dramatic increase that lasted until the end of the year. Verleger’s examines the oil markets in 2006-07 with the goal of isolating the underlying supply and demand factors causing the increase last year.
Debunking the Popular Myths
The most popular explanation for the 2007 price increase is growing demand from China, which now consumes 8.5% of the world supply (versus 24% for the U.S.). For an example of how this line of reasoning is presented by one prominent economist, see Dealing with the Dragon. Verleger’s data shows this is not a reasonable explanation. The Chinese market has been correctly forecasted for the last several years. There was no abnormal spike in demand from China (or from India or other markets) during the latter half of last year. As Verleger notes, “it is hard to attribute the sudden price boost to oil buyers waking up to the fact that the global economy was expanding and oil use was rising.”
Supply was not being adversely affected by political disputes or international conflict. If anything, the international dynamics were calmer in 2007 than they were in 2006, as evidenced by the declining casualty rate in Iraq. This was not the source of the price increases.
A shortage of sweet crude in the world markets in 2007 caused the Saudis to increase production of sour crude. This led to a price decline in sour crude prices relative to sweet crude, well-documented in publicly available data. The Saudis were not responsible for the spike.
Speculation did not cause a price spike. Verleger’s data shows investments in commodities, as an asset class, increased from $100 billion to $170 billion in 2007, but most of this increase occurred before the beginning of the August price rise. In addition, the open interest in oil futures contracts was decreasing while prices were increasing, showing that speculators (or whoever was investing in the futures markets at that time) had a diminishing influence on oil prices. Verleger argues the “data seem to exonerate speculators.”
In addition to the oil futures traded on the commodities exchanges, oil experts also look to price movements in “trust” securities (such as the BP Prudhoe Bay Royalty Trust) to calibrate expectations of future prices. If these trusts indicate that oil prices are heading for a sharp increase, oil producers will cut back supply and/or raise current prices until equilibrium is reached. Data show these trusts have a better record of predicting price movements than projections offered by government agencies. Yet future prices implied by these trusts were stable in 2006-07 timeframe, so they cannot explain the 2007 price increase.
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